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Abstract
We construct models of group formation designed to capture some of
the key features of political and social competition. The models draw on
the ‘citizen candidate’ approach and allow competition to be modelled
as either compromise - where all groups in‡uence outcomes; or con‡ict -
where one group wins the right to dictate. We also consider both instru-
mental and expressive approaches to understanding group formation, …rst
s e p a r a t e l ya n dt h e ni nas e t t i n gw h i c he n c o m p a s s e sb o t ha p p r o a c h e s .
JEL Classi…cation: D71, D72, D74
Keywords: Group Formation, Expressive Behaviour, Con‡ict, Com-
promise.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The major objective of this paper is to contribute to the analysis of political
competition. However, our starting point is to note that political competition
is almost always best seen as competition between groups, rather than between
individuals. These groups might be rival political parties competing within a
highly structured constitutional framework that sets out the rules of competition
in some detail, and where elections may be thought of as the major battle…eld
on which political competition is played out. Alternatively, the groups might
be rival gangs competing in an essentially unstructured environment where the
idea of a battle…eld may be all too literal a description of the mode of compe-
tition. Political competition, as we conceive it, therefore covers the full range
of activities from electoral competition to political violence. But, wherever in
this range any particular case of political competition may lie, we identify the
group nature of political competition as an important part of what makes any
particular instance of competition political.
In most models of political competition in the rational actor tradition, how-
ever, the group nature of political action is glossed over - political rivals may
1sometimes be referred to as ‘parties’, but - following Downs (1957) - they are al-
most always analysed as if they were individuals. In addition, citizens/voters are
usually treated as separated from the political parties which compete for their
support. However, to varying degrees in di¤erent societies, parties are actually
the representatives of the distinct groups from which they emerged. We follow
Demsetz (1990) in seeing political parties as appealing not just to an ‘external
constituency’, but also to an ‘internal constituency’ and in this paper we wish to
focus our attention upon the emergence of these internal constituencies. It will
not, however, be our purpose in this paper to explicitly model the emergence
of political parties. Rather, as a …rst and fundamental step towards that future
task, our purpose is to model the emergence of political groups, some of which
might develop into political parties.
In moving away from the narrowly individualistic model of political com-
petition, we should emphasise that we are not abandoning the commitment to
methodological individualism. We are merely concerned to push the level of
analysis back one step to focus attention on the formation of the relevant po-
litical groups - whether parties, factions, gangs or whatever. The basic idea is
to think about the emergence of political groups from individual behaviour as a
preliminary step to employing those political groups as key features of a variety
of models of political competition, although, of course, some discussion of the
eventual roles of political groups will often (but not necessarily always) be rele-
vant to the analysis of their formation. One clear aspect of political groups that
must be built into the discussion from the outset, is that political groups are by
their nature con‡ictual. We are not dealing with the emergence of consumption
clubs (see Buchanan (1965) and Cornes and Sandler (1996)) where, at least in
many cases, it is sensible to begin with the case in which clubs, once formed, do
not interact with each other. Political groups, as we understand them here, are
by their nature rivals in at least some key aspects of their activities.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the two key
elements that we use to develop the idea of the endogenous formation of po-
litical groups. These are the citizen-candidate approach, which has been used
to endogenise candidate emergence in elections, and the idea of expressive - as
distinct from instrumental - political behaviour. Section 3 will brie‡y review
two extant approaches to social and political groups that lie broadly in the ra-
tional actor tradition and that are of direct relevance to this paper. Section 4
will then develop a series of models that attempt to capture important elements
of the process of group formation. Finally, section 5 will o¤er some concluding
comments.
2 Key Ideas
As already indicated, the two fundamental ideas that will be key to our analysis
are the ideas of endogenous political agents and of expressive political action.
Each of these ideas may be thought of as developing in reaction to perceived
limitations in the benchmark Public Choice model of political competition. In
2the case of the citizen-candidate model of endogenous political agency, the rel-
evant limitation was the ad hoc nature of the speci…cation of candidates in
‘standard’ models of electoral competition, ad hoc both in the identi…cation of
the number of candidates to be considered (with or without any possibility of
entry), and in the speci…cation of their motivation. In the case of expressive
political behaviour - and particularly expressive voting - the relevant limitation
concerned the classic ‘paradox of voting’ as an example of the free-rider problem
that applies in many large-number political situations, where it may be di¢cult
to identify individual incentives to act on purely instrumental grounds.
We will use the citizen-candidate approach and expressive motivation in
Section 4 to derive models of the emergence of political groups, but …rst, we
w i l lo ¤ e rs o m eb r i e fi n t r o d u c t o r yc o m m e n t so ne a c hi d e ai nt u r n .
2.1 Endogenous Political Agents - Citizen-Candidate Mod-
els
In response to the limitations of the standard model associated with the ad hoc
and exogenous speci…cation of political candidates, Osborne and Slivinski (1996)
and Besley and Coate (1997) introduced a class of models which endogenises
candidate emergence. The basic set-up in these models identi…es a three-stage
game. In stage one, each individual citizen faces a decision of whether to stand
as a candidate or not; in stage two, voting takes place given a set of candidates;
in stage three, policy is implemented given the results of the election. In both
Osborne and Slivinski and Besley and Coate, individuals operate with the same
preferences over policy outcomes as candidates as they do as citizen-voters, and
the voting rule employed in stage two of the game is simple plurality voting so
that the election always produces a single winner, and that winning candidate
implements her ideal policy in stage three of the game. Hamlin and Hjortlund
(2000) extend the analysis to the case of proportional representation, so allowing
compromise between candidates in the third stage of the game and a richer sense
of representation within the model. They also discuss the possibility of allowing
o¢ce-rents as well as policy considerations to motivate citizens in their choice
of whether or not to stand as candidates.
While these citizen-candidate models clearly make a considerable step for-
ward, they equally clearly retain the commitment to modelling political actors
as individuals. It is of the essence of these models that individual citizens make
individual decisions to become individual candidates. In order to extend the
structure of citizen-candidate models to the study of electoral competition be-
tween groups we might …rst think in terms of a four-stage game, where the …rst
stage now identi…es the endogenous emergence of political groups or parties; the
second stage determines the choice of platform within each party; the third stage
includes the election; while the fourth stage implements policy.1 Of course, such
1For an analysis which aims to achieve this extra dimension of political party emergence
prior to policy emergence see Haan (1999). Note that Haan’s model assumes that individuals
are instrumentally motivated.
3a model would then be a speci…c model of political groups in electoral competi-
tion, rather than a more general model of political groups in forms of political
competition that may range far beyond elections. An alternative line of thought
that o¤ers a less restricted account of the nature of the eventual competition
between groups, and a more detailed account of the process of group emergence,
would reinterpret the basic citizen-candidate model di¤erently. We might now
conceive of the …rst stage of the game as one in which potential group founders
or focal points emerge which o¤er a set of group norms to be followed. The
second stage of the game could be conceived as one in which citizens decide
which - if any - group to join, and a third stage of the game as the forum within
which groups compete and which determines political or social outcomes. We
shall explore models of this form below.
2.2 Expressive Political Action
In response to the limitations of the standard model associated with the critique
of the instrumentally rational political action in the face of the free rider prob-
lem, Brennan and Lomasky (1993) and Brennan and Hamlin (1998) provide
an account of expressive voting that motivates political action by reference to
direct, expressive bene…ts2. The basic starting point of this line of argument
is that in many cases of political action (such as voting in mass elections), in-
dividual action may be almost entirely inconsequential, so that any individual
who was motivated only by instrumental considerations, and also faced a small
cost of action, would not act. The more constructive part of the argument then
suggests that once the individual is released from the simple instrumental cal-
culus, she may engage in a more expressive calculus in which rather di¤erent
considerations will weigh in determining the nature of the political act. Political
acts will be opportunities to identify with certain causes, display loyalty to a
particular candidate or party, or express some other feeling or prejudice at low
cost. The idea of expressive voting, in itself, o¤ers an explanation of certain
types of political acts but it does not o¤er simple or direct normative analysis
of those acts, since the link between expressive concerns and interests is by no
means direct. At the same time, expressive voting is only one ingredient in any
model of political process. The relevance and impact of expressive behaviour
will depend greatly on the details of the institutional arrangements, and on
other structural aspects of the model. It is important to note that expressive
behaviour is no less rational than instrumental behaviour. Formally, this is just
to say that both expressive and instrumental motivation can be explained side-
by-side within a generalised utility function, with the particular circumstances
of a choice situation selecting which type of motivation is the more relevant.
In the standard citizen-candidate models outlined above, all political agents
are taken to act instrumentally. One aspect of this assumption is that behaviour
in the …rst stage of the game is motivated by reference to its impact on outcomes
2Applications of the idea of expressive voting are provided by Brennan and Hamlin (1999,
2000).
4in the …nal stage of the game. It is precisely this sort of assumption that
is subject to the criticism from expressive behaviour, since the link between
individual behaviour and …nal social outcome is so tenuous as to break any
link of this type, once a cost of action (voting) is added and action is made
voluntary. The expressive line of argument would have to o¤er some more
proximate and non-contingent motivator of activity in the …rst stages of the
game. We believe that the shift to the focus on political groups o¤ers one such
possibility. In particular, we believe that group membership may be motivated
by direct, expressive considerations linked to the simple and proximate bene…ts
derived from inclusion in, and identi…cation with, a relevant group; rather than
by indirect, instrumental consideration of the policy e¤ects or other social e¤ects
that may arise at a later stage of the political process. This is not to deny that
instrumental considerations may be important to some political actors at some
stages of the game, but merely to argue that the balance between instrumental
and expressive considerations as motivators of political action will depend on
the structure of the game and the role of the individual within that structure.
One clear possibility raised by the introduction of expressively motivated
political activity is that the behaviour in early stages of a political game may be
largely - or even wholly - independent of the consequences of that behaviour in
later stages. Thus, for example, decisions of whether or not to join a particular
political group may be e¤ectively divorced from the exact speci…cation of how
that group will operate to determine …nal political outcomes. The converse is,
however, not the case. While individual behaviour may be divorced from its
long-range and contingent consequences as a matter of motivation, the long-run
outcomes are still consequences of the initial individual behaviour in a causal
sense. This opens up an additional line of argument - characteristic of the
expressive approach to political action - for identifying political outcomes as the
unintended consequences of individual political action, even though the political
action was fully rational in the relevant sense.
3 Related Approaches to Social and Political
Groups
This paper is clearly linked to spatial theories of voting. However, we focus on
a broader class of ‘group activity’ rather than limiting attention to the case of
voting. Relevant ‘group activities’ may include obviously collective activities
as attending meetings, but may also include more private activities such as
following rules of behaviour laid down by the group. More generally, ‘group
activities’ will be distinguished by the adoption of a distinct group norm. As
already stated, the idea of expressive voting provides an explanation for why
people actually vote and likewise, in the present setting, expressive motivation
may provide an explanation for the adoption of a group norm, and hence group
activity.
In this way, expressive motivation is linked to the classic Olson (1965) ex-
5planation of how groups overcome collective action problems. Olson looked to
the provision of selective incentives (either negative or positive) as inducements
to group action, as any public good incentive is e¤ectively zero. Applications of
the Olson approach are myriad (see Sandler (1992) for a survey), for example
Tullock (1971) analysed how revolutions might come to be provided.3 In this
paper expressive considerations play the role of direct incentives to individuals
to engage in group action.
Against this background two recent developments in the discussion of groups
are particularly noteworthy. Hardin (1995) departs from the Olson model by
emphasising the coordination aspect of the decision to form a group, rather
than the free-rider or prisoner’s dilemma aspect. Kuran (1995) emphasises the
importance of social psychology and argues that reputational concerns may be
su¢cient to induce individuals into preference falsi…cation. These approaches
to collective action deserve special attention for …ve main reasons. First, both
emphasise that group behaviour is identi…ed by the adoption of group norms.
Second, the adoption of group norms provide a source of power to the group,
which may lead the group into con‡ict with other groups. Third, they both
provide a theory (in their di¤erent ways) of how unforeseen and very possibly
unwanted outcomes may emerge. Fourth, the ‘issue space’ upon which the
groups gather is interpreted much more broadly than is usual to include religion
or ethnicity. Finally, both approaches operate within the broad rational choice
tradition. We will discuss these two contributions in turn in slightly more detail.
3.1 Hardin - Coordinating Action
Hardin provides a relatively informal analysis of both the formation of groups
and inter-group con‡ict. He starts from the observation that a primary reason
for being in a group is to achieve power. Power comes in two forms: ‘coordi-
nation power’ that derives from individuals conforming to some group-speci…c
norm or activity; and ‘exchange power’ which derives from the group’s ability
to amass economic resources - either thorough production or through predation.
coordination power is seen as logically prior to exchange power. These two types
of power may be seen as underpinning the Hobbesian social contract. In that
case, the whole population co-ordinates to form a social contract whereby some
liberty is surrendered to a sovereign. However this provides the basis for secure
property rights and the accumulation of economic resources. Here coordina-
tion power is seen as a prerequisite to exchange power, where exchange power
relates to production which depends on secure property rights and protection
from predation.
Hardin extends these basic features to explain how separate and con‡icting
groups may form. coordination power is derived from individuals coordinating
around particular behavioural norms which provide the group with its identity.
For some members this might be seen as the playing of a simple coordination
3See Lichbach (1995) for a comprehensive overview of theories concerned with the provision
of political violence.
6game where they face no internal con‡ict in pursuing these norms. However,
others may face a prisoners’ dilemma incentive to free-ride on the groups’ activ-
ities, while enjoying the bene…ts of membership. This distinction between those
facing a coordination game and those facing incentives to defect, separates the
dedicated core of the group from the less dedicated fringe. However, the fringe
are faced with social pressures from those that have co-ordinated that may pre-
vent them from free-riding, and as such social pressures act as negative selective
incentives.
Clearly, for inter-group con‡ict to arise, separate groups must form. Why
do we not see the whole population conform around a single set of norms?
Why would members of a group wish to be di¤erent, to exclude
non-members? Often because there might be bene…ts to member-
ship. Bene…ts can take at least two quite di¤erent forms....First,
some subgroup or coalition can bene…ts its members most quickly
by excluding others from access to the limited resources. Here the
group is a means to other goods.
Second, there may be straightforward bene…ts of comfort,
familiarity and easy communication in one’s group. (1995, p.76.)
The source of political con‡ict relates to predatory behaviour or ‘rent-seeking’
in public choice terminology.
In this account, identi…cation with a group matters because it can
lead to coordination for great power. That power might then be used
more for destruction than for creation just because destruction is
easier and more readily focused on speci…c, extant objectives. (1995,
p.9.).
Thus, for political violence to emerge separate groups must form around
certain types of norms, and at least one of these groups must then engage in
predatory behaviour.
The models we develop below attempt to formalise some aspects of Hardin’s
account by discussing the potential bene…ts to be derived from group mem-
bership under two distinct headings - one associated with the external role of
groups acting in potential con‡ict with other groups, and the other associated
with the internal role of groups as providing its members with a sense of identity
or belonging. His emphasis on group norms as the basis of group strength is
followed here and the idea of a fringe and core of more or less dedicated mem-
bers is developed in this model, where the less dedicated engage in less group
activity.
3.2 Kuran - Preference Falsi…cation
Kuran begins from the idea that when individuals perform an action they may
receive utility from three di¤erent sources. He identi…es intrinsic utility with
the instrumental outcome of an action, reputational utility with the approval or
7disapproval one receives from other people, and …nally expressive utility with
the utility one receives from being true to one’s self regardless of the actual
outcome. One result of the interaction between these three sources of utility is
that if the pressure of reputational utility is strong, individuals may conform
to certain types of group norms,4 even if they would privately prefer di¤erent
modes of behaviour. Kuran calls this type of behaviour preference falsi…cation,
since it amounts to hiding one’s ‘true’ preferences out of a desire to …t into a
reference group.
Kuran uses his theory of preference falsi…cation as a basis for discussing how
particular norms become embedded within a society and how they can change
rapidly through the mechanism of a reputational cascade. At this stage we will
not discuss this more dynamic part of his analysis. The key point for now is
that social pressures may e¤ect what one says and what one does - that groups
imply their own norms of activity and may demand compliance to at least some
extent.
Kuran’s theory is most powerful in providing a microfoundation for adher-
ing to group norms. However, while Kuran explains group solidarity, he fails
to explain either group identity or voluntary membership. Group solidarity is
achieved through the application of social pressure, but the preference falsi…-
cation that follows does not provide a sense of individuals identifying with the
group. Equally, Kuran takes membership of a group as his starting point with
no option of either joining or leaving the group. While this is appropriate for
his discussion of ethnic groups, it is clearly not satisfactory more generally.
While the models to be developed below are similar to Kuran’s in some ways -
Kuran distinguishes between instrumental/intrinsic utility and expressive utility
(although our sense of expressive utility is not exactly that of Kuran), and in the
following models we depict individuals pursuing norms that would not be their
personal preference - there are also clear di¤erences in that we focus explicitly
on the membership decision, and therefore on the potential trade-o¤ between
costs and bene…ts of membership. Membership of a group may help to achieve
particular instrumental bene…ts, and may also help to forge a sense of identity;
but there may be costs of membership in terms of compliance to norms that are
not ideal from the individual’s perspective.
4 The Models
As already indicated, the basic structure of the citizen candidate model will
provide our point of reference. However, there will be several departures from
the basic version of the citizen-candidate model. These may be introduced via
two distinctions: between instrumental and expressive behaviour on the one
hand, and between con‡ict and compromise on the other. As already outlined,
the basic point underlying the instrumental/expressive distinction is that an
4For example they may state politcal preferences simply to conform, such as support of
communist dictatorships (Kuran 1989, 1991 and 1995), or conform to norms of ethnicity
(Kuran 1998).
8essentially instrumental model of individual behaviour will always tie individual
behaviour at the early stages of the model - the stage of group formation - to the
eventual outcome of the competition between groups. In this way, instrumental
actors may be said to ‘see through’ the structure of the model and map their
own actions at each stage to …nal outcomes. The expressive line of argument, by
contrast, denies this link and looks for more proximate explanations of political
action. While, up to now, we have stressed the relative signi…cance of expressive
motivation as opposed to instrumental motivation in political settings, we will
initially present models where we assume that only one type of motivation is
present. Models 1 and 2 will be purely instrumental and model 3 will be purely
expressive. This allows us to make the distinction between them as sharp as
possible. Once the nature of these extreme case models has been clari…ed, model
4 will attempt to combine both instrumental and expressive elements.
Before turning in detail to the models, we shall …rst discuss the underlying
game structure of these models. As already mentioned, the citizen candidate
approach adopted a three-stage game, which is solved by backwards induction to
provide subgame perfect equilibria. For illustration we shall take the plurality
rule game (as used by Besley and Coate and Osborne and Slivinski) as our
reference point and consider each stage in turn.5
In the …nal stage of the game, the only credible policy for the winner of the
election is to implement her preferred policy, (where in the case of an electoral
tie a winner is determined by the toss of a coin). This is apparent to all citizens
in stage two of the game, and here a voting equilibrium will exist, such that
- given the set of candidates, and the policies that each would implement if
elected - each citizen’s vote is a best response to the votes of all other citizens.
Finally, in the …rst stage of the game, given the anticipated voting equilibrium
and impact on …nal policy outcome, each individual citizen will decide whether
to stand as a candidate or not subject to some entry cost, so that an equilibrium
of the entry game is identi…ed.6 Hamlin and Hjortland follow the same formal
structure, but instead of plurality rule, the policy in stage three is determined
by proportional representation, which substantially e¤ects the equilibria of the
game.
The models to be presented here also maintain the same formal structure and
general solution method. However, just as Hamlin and Hjortland changed one
aspect of the Besley and Coate model to consider proportional representation,
the models presented here will change other aspects (often radically) within the
three stages of the game. However, the common outline of all of the models to
be discussed may be sketched as follows: in stage one individual decide whether
or not to provide a focal point around which a group may emerge, subject to
an entry cost. Those that decide to act in this way will be referred to as the
founders of groups and may be thought of as identifying a particular norm.
In stage two, individuals who did not themselves found groups either attach
5See Besley and Coate for a formal description of the game.
6See Besley and Coate on the existence of an equilibrium. There will always be a mixed
strategy equilibrium at the entry stage. However, the focus of their paper, Hamlin and
Hjortland’s and of this paper will be on pure strategy equilibria.
9themselves to a group or choose to be independent. Finally, in stage three,
the groups interact in some way to determine a social outcome that a¤ects all
individuals.
The instrumental/expressive distinction and the con‡ict/compromise dis-
tinction may now be located within this general outline. In the purely instru-
mental models the payo¤ to individuals will be speci…ed solely in terms of the
…nal social outcome determined by the interaction between groups; it is in this
sense that individuals are modelled as seeing through the entire game to the
…nal social outcome which will dictate their choices over whether to found a
group, join a group or be independent. In the expressive model, by contrast,
individuals base their group attachment decisions upon factors such as the size
of groups they would prefer to be members of, and their location within those
groups, without reference to the …nal social outcomes that may emerge from
the interaction between groups. Note, however, that while social outcomes
play no motivational role ex ante in the expressive model, they will have an
e¤ect upon utility ex post. The con‡ict/compromise distinction relates to the
form of the eventual interaction between groups. Con‡ict identi…es a relatively
sharp form of competition, while compromise identi…es a more moderate form
of rivalry. More speci…cally, con‡ict situations will be ones in which groups face
each other in a winner-take-all contest; so that the idea of con‡ict might be
associated with simple …rst-past-the post electoral rules or with recent develop-
ment in political economy that stress the violent element in the emergence of
social institutions (see Usher (1992) and Gar…nkel and Skaperdas (1996)). By
contrast, compromise situations will be ones in which groups interact in such
a way that the …nal social outcome can be de…ned in terms of a weighted av-
erage of the positions that would be chosen by each group if it had monopoly
power; so that the idea of compromise might be associated with electoral rules
supporting proportional representation and coalition building, or with ideas of
a social contract. Since the contrast between con‡ict and compromise relates
to the form of the eventual interaction between groups, it is clear that it will be
signi…cant as a motivation for individual action only in models of group forma-
tion that emphasise instrumental behaviour. Models 1 and 2 below will examine
this distinction by viewing compromise and con‡ict respectively.
Formally, models 1 and 2 below are closely related to the models of Hamlin
and Hjortlund and Besley and Coate respectively. This is because, as we have
just said, the contrast between compromise and con‡ict relates quite closely to
the distinction between proportional representation and plurality voting. In one
sense, then, the discussion of models 1 and 2 may be seen as a reinterpretation
of the formal structure of the Hamlin and Hjortlund and Besley and Coate
models into the context of group formation, and an opportunity to establish
ideas and appropriate notation for models 3 and 4 to follow. However, there is
one further novelty of the sequence of models to be discussed that requires some
further introduction - the activity rate of an individual member of a group. An
individual’s activity rate - or the total activity within a particular group - bears
rather di¤erent interpretation in each of the models to be presented, and also
provides a clear departure from the models of Hamlin and Hjortlund or Besley
10and Coate, since there is no analogue of the activity rate in a voting model.
The broad idea of the activity rate is that it stands as a measure of the degree
of involvement of the individual in the group. This might be interpreted as the
level of identi…cation that the individual feels for the group, or an index of the
personal cost of membership, for example. We will comment more speci…cally
on the interpretation of individual activity rates in each of the following models.
4.1 Model 1 - Instrumental Social Compromise
We begin with the case in which all agents are purely instrumental in their ap-
proach to decision making, and where the eventual form of competition between
groups involves compromise. The issue space is taken to be one dimensional and
the ideal points of individuals are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the
interval [0;1]. As already mentioned, in stage one of the process, individuals
decide whether or not to establish a group (become a group founder). If a group
is formed, that group takes on the ideal point of its founder as its collective po-
sition. This is revealed by the group pursuing a set of behavioural norms that
are uniquely associated with the preferences over social outcomes that charac-
terise the founder. Under instrumental calculation, an individual will decide to
found a group if the bene…t in terms of the expected impact on the …nal social
outcome outweighs the cost of group formation. This cost will be taken to be a
…xed transaction cost, c, associated with establishing one’s position as a group
founder. The form of the payo¤ to individual j who founds a group is:
Uj = ¡jP ¡ xjj¡c (1)
where xj is j0s ideal point and P is the eventual social outcome. We now need
to explain how the outcome P is determined.
In stage two, all individuals who have decided not to found groups will
a¢liate themselves with the group that is closest to them. This statement may
be broken into two parts. First, that all individuals will join a group, so that
there will be no independents or ‘outsiders’. For the moment, we simply assume
that for all individuals, the marginal bene…t of group activity/membership is
(weakly) greater than marginal cost over the relevant range and that there are
no transaction or …xed costs to group membership. Second that each individual
will join the group whose founder is closest to her, this can be demonstrated
given the other assumptions of the model.
We now turn to the individual’s activity within a group. In a fully speci…ed
model, this activity rate would itself be endogenous, however this would intro-
duce additional complexity which we do not wish to explore in this paper. The
idea that we wish to capture is that group members face alternative activities
- activity within the group must be balanced against private activities outside
of the group - so that the level of group activity can be expected to vary across
group members. We will assume that the further away an individual is from the
group’s ideal position, the less will be that individual member’s activity within
the group - so that activists are identi…ed as those close to the founder, while
11more peripheral members will be less active in support of the group’s position.
While we assume that there is no transaction or …xed cost of group member-
ship, there is an implicit cost in terms of activity. This cost could be seen as
the opportunity cost of time spent on group activity, and will be higher for
individuals located further from the founder, thus lowering their activity rate.7
To simplify matters, we will assume that the activity rate of individual member
i, yi,i sg i v e nb y :
yi =1¡j xj ¡ xij (2)
where xj is the position of group founder j,a n dxi is the position of the in-
dividual member i: For a particular group, with a founder at xj we can then
calculate the total group activity rate, Yj , by summing activity rates for all
individual members or, in the continuous case that we study here, taking the
relevant integral over all members of the group:
Yj =
Z
yi (3)
In this particular version of the model, then, the activity rate is to be in-
terpreted at the individual level as a measure of the strength of an individual’s
contribution to the group, and at the aggregate level as a measure of the impact
or weight that the group will exert in in‡uencing social outcomes.
In stage three, the …nal social compromise emerges. We de…ne this outcome
as the weighted mean of the ideal positions of the groups, where the relevant
weight for each group is related to that group’s activity level:
P =
X
j
vjxj (4)
where vj is a normalized measure of the aggregate activity level of the group
based at xj:
vj =
Yj P
j
Yj
(5)
A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists if:
jP¡j ¡ xjj¡j Pj ¡ xjj¡c > 0 (6)
for all group founders j,a n d
jP¡i ¡ xij¡j Pi ¡ xij¡c<0 (7)
7As stated, we assume for the meantime that there is an instrumental bene…t to group
activity, which is positive enough to outweigh the marginal cost of activity over some range.
However, it is just this sort of assumption that leaves models in political settings which are
built on instrumental motivation open to attack.
12for all non-founders i,w h e r ePj is the outcome from j f o r m i n gag r o u pa n dP¡j
is the outcome if j decides not to form a group. The following results all ‡ow
from these equilibrium conditions. Clearly the number of groups that form in
equilibrium is endogenous. To rule out the possibility of no group emerging, we
assume that U = ¡z for all individuals when there are no groups, where z>c ,
so that each individual would prefer to found a group rather than accept an
equilibrium in which no groups emerge. It should also be clear that however
many groups emerge, they must be distinct in the sense that no equilibria can
exist in which more than one group founder occupies any given position (this
mirrors Hamlin and Hjortlund’s lemma 1). To see this, simply notice that if two
individuals were to found groups at the same position, the payo¤ for one of them
would be greater if she disbanded her own group, with all members joining the
other group. The second group would have no impact on social outcomes, but
would incur the …xed cost. We will proceed by investigating equilibria in which
there is just one group, before discussing two-group and n-group equilibria.
4.1.1 One-Group Equilibrium
To establish an equilibrium with the single group based at a we must demon-
strate that no individual will wish to found a rival group. To prevent group
formation at, say, b we require that:
b
0
B
@
Yb P
j
Yj
1
C
A + a
0
B
@
Ya P
j
Yj
1
C
A ¡ a ¡ c<0 (8)
or
aYa + bYb
Ya + Yb
¡ a<c (9)
for all b>aand:
a ¡
0
B
@a
0
B
@
Ya P
j
Yj
1
C
A + b
0
B
@
Yb P
j
Yj
1
C
A
1
C
A ¡ c<0 (10)
or
a ¡
aYa + bYb
Ya + Yb
<c (11)
for all b<a .
To see how any position may support a one-group equilibrium, one may
begin by considering the value c must take to allow the extreme positions of
0 or 1 to be one-group equilibria. Here our model departs signi…cantly from
13the model in Hamlin and Hjortlund since, in Hamlin and Hjortlund’s model all
votes count equally in support of the chosen candidate, whereas in our model,
members contribute di¤erentially to their groups depending on their activity
rates. So, while, in Hamlin and Hjortlund’s model, it is clear that the potential
candidate with the greatest incentive to enter against a candidate located at 0 is
an individual located at 1 (and vice versa), the analogous statement is not true
in our model. This is because, ceteris paribus, a group founder at an extreme
point generates less group activity than a group founder at an interior position.
In order to …nd which potential group founder would have the greatest in-
centive to found a group in the presence of a group located at 0, we substitute
a =0in the left hand side of equation 9 to obtain:
bYb
Ya + Yb
(12)
Plugging in the values for Ya and Yb and maximising with respect to b gives
an optimum value of b of approximately 0:935, with a maximised value of the
expression of 0:5052.8 Therefore, an individual located at 0:935 has the greatest
incentive to form a group in the presence of a group located at 0,a n dt h i s
incentive would be su¢cient to overcome any …xed cost less than 0:5052: So,
c>0:5052 is certainly a su¢cient condition for one-group equilibria. With
c above this critical level, a group located at any position will constitute a
one-group equilibrium. As c falls below the critical value the range of possible
one-group equilibria tightens as described by equations 9 and 11 until the point
where these two constraints intersect at c ' 0:1359. At this value of c, 0:5 is
the only location that could support one-group equilibrium.
We can summarize the conditions for one-group equilibria as follows:
8To see how this is calculated note that
Ya =
Z b
2
0
(1 ¡ x)dx =
1
2
b ¡
1
8
b2
and
Yb =
Z b
b
2
(1 ¡ (b ¡ x))dx +
Z 1
b
(1 ¡ (x ¡ b))dx =
1
2
b ¡
5
8
b2 +
1
2
After some manipulation, we obtain
bYb
Ya + Yb
=
¡1
8b
¡
¡4b +5 b2 ¡ 4
¢
b ¡ 3
4b2 + 1
2
which yields:
µ
1
2
b
¶
¡4b +5 b2 ¡ 4
¡4b +3 b2 ¡ 2
Maximising with respect to b gives an optimum value of b of approxiamtely 0.935, with a
maximised value of the expression of 0.5052.
14iI fc>0:5052 any position can support a one-group equilibria.
ii If 0:1359 <c<0:5052,t h e np o i n ta can support a one group equilibrium
if it satis…es both equations 9 and 11, which gives
b ¡
c(Ya + Yb)
Yb
<a<
c(Ya + Yb)
Yb
+ b (13)
for all b:
A key point to note here is that one individual will become a group founder,
but will attract no group activity. In an instrumental model, individuals are
motivated to act in order to achieve instrumental gains. In a one-group equi-
librium however, group activity will bring about no change in social outcomes
and therefore the incentive to join a group is gone. As such, the outcome would
be determined by one founder, who will receive no group a¢liation. This seems
strange when we think of dictatorships, which receive group-oriented behaviour.
However, this is precisely the point, group participation in situations where only
one group exists is di¢cult if not impossible to explain using an instrumental
model. Participation suggests that other factors are at work, as we shall explore
later.
4.1.2 Two-Group Equilibrium
Clearly, two-group equilibrium requires both that two founders are willing to
found groups in each others presence, and that no other founder would emerge.
For two founders to be willing to run against each other requires essentially the
reverse of the conditions described in the last subsection. So, for a potential
founder located at a<bto emerge alongside b, it must be that the case that:
b ¡
µ
aYa
Ya + Yb
+
bYb
Ya + Yb
¶
¸ c (14)
which reduces to
Ya (b ¡ a)
Ya + Yb
¸ c (15)
and for b>ato be willing to form a group in the presence of a,i tm u s tb e
that:
µ
bYb
Ya + Yb
+
aYa
Ya + Yb
¶
¡ a ¸ c (16)
which reduces to:
Yb (b ¡ a)
Ya + Yb
¸ c (17)
15Note that as c falls from approximately 0:5052 (so that equilibria with more
than one group become feasible) the co-existing groups may be closer together.
The next step is to demonstrate the conditions under which no third group
will wish to enter. Hamlin and Hjortlund’s lemma 2 eliminates the possibility of
intermediate candidates in their election model, but this lemma does not carry
over to the present case. Again, the explanation lies in the variable activity
rate in this model. If all activity rates were constant, it should be clear that an
intermediate group could have no impact on the eventual social outcome, given
the weighted average nature of the compromise outcome. This is essentially the
analogue of Hamlin and Hjortlund’s lemma 2. However, with variable activity
rates it should be equally clear that this argument fails. A new intermediate
group would generate more activity out of its members than would have been
generated by their membership of the existing groups, and this opens up the
possibility of intermediate groups.
However, given the assumption we have made for activity rates, the possi-
bility is rather remote. That is, the …xed cost c has to be rather low before
any intermediate group is sustainable in equilibrium. We can use the case in
which the two established groups, a and b,a r el o c a t e da t0 and 1 respectively
to illustrate this, by observing that if c is su¢cient to prevent the formation of
an intermediate group in this case, then it will certainly be su¢cient to prevent
intermediate entry in all two-group equilibria. In this case a potential group
founder, located at d , would face the following incentive to form a group:
j0:5 ¡ dj¡
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dYd + Yb
Ya + Yb + Yd
¡ d
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ (18)
Making the relevant substitutions, it is straightforward, if tedious, to check that
the individuals facing the maximal incentive to form a group are located at
approximately 0:8 and 0:2. The intuition here is clear enough, in the absence
of the third group the compromise outcome will be 0.5. A new group can be
worthwhile to its founder only if she has an ideal point signi…cantly di¤erent
from 0.5. However, if the third group’s ideal point is too close to either 0 or 1,
the new group will have little impact on the compromise outcome, since they
would e¤ectively replace one of the existing groups. The trade o¤ between these
two forces identities the location of the individual with the maximal incentive.
However, even when the incentive is maximised, it is rather small. The impact
on the …nal compromise outcome is to shift it by only approximately 0:01445.
Therefore, if c>0:01445 there can be no formation of an intermediate group,
and therefore no equilibria with more than two groups.
Of course, for a two-group equilibrium, we require not only that the two
groups will form in each others presence, and that no intermediate group will
form, but also that there will be no incentive for a further group to form outside
of the range a;b: This will be assured if a (the left most group) is such as to
preclude further group formation on the left, and b (the right most group) is
such as to preclude further group formation on the right. Call the potential
leftist group l, and the potential rightist group r, then the condition to prevent
the formation of l is the natural extension of equation 11:
16Pab ¡
aYa + bYb + lYl
Ya + Yb + Yl
<c (19)
where Pab is the compromise outcome when a and b are the only groups in place.
Similarly, the condition to prevent the formation of r is:
aYa + bYb + lYr
Ya + Yb + Yr
¡ Pab <c (20)
To summarise the conditions for two-group equilibria:
iI fc>0:5052 no two group equilibrium is possible.
ii If 0:01445 <c<0:5052, groups located at a and b (where a<b ) will form
a two-group equilibrium provided that conditions 15 and 17 are satis…ed.
This requires that;
½µ
b ¡
c(Ya + Yb)
Yb
¶
;
µ
b ¡
c(Ya + Yb)
Ya
¶¾
¸ a (21)
and;
b ¸
½µ
c(Ya + Yb)
Yb
+ a
¶
;
µ
c(Ya + Yb)
Ya
+ a
¶¾
(22)
and that conditions 19 and 20 are satis…ed.
iii If 0 <c<0:01445 we require the additional condition that no intermediate
group will emerge. This requires that;
Pab ¡
aYa + dYd + bYb
Ya + Yd + Yb
<c (23)
for d<a+b
2 and;
aYa + dYd + bYb
Ya + Yd + Yb
¡ Pab <c (24)
for d>a+b
2 .
The interpretation of the conditions in (ii) and (iii) are relatively straight-
forward. Condition 21 and 22 ensures that a and b will form in each others
presence, while conditions 19 and 20 ensure that there will be no outside groups
formed. Conditions 23 and 24 ensure no intermediate entry when costs are low
enough to allow this to happen. In particular, while for any value of c in the
identi…ed range, there will always exist a two-group equilibrium (many such
equilibria, in general) it is not the case that one can select an arbitrary group
founder a¤ and guarantee that there will be a second group founder b¤,s u c h
17that (a¤;b¤) forms a two-group equilibrium. A key point to note now is that all
individuals may be seen as having an incentive to engage in group activity, as
their action will have some bearing on the overall social outcome.910.
4.1.3 Discussion of model 1
This model of instrumental social compromise builds quite directly on the Ham-
lin and Hjortlund model of proportional representation. The mechanism of com-
promise between groups is essentially similar to the mechanism of proportional
representation in the voting context analysed by Hamlin and Hjortlund. The
major di¤erence lies in the idea of variable activity rates, which makes good
sense in the context of the operation of political groups, but has no counterpart
in a model of voting where all votes are of equal weight. This di¤erence gives
us a more realistic sense of a political/social group to which members attach
themselves to varying degrees.
There are three further points to note. First, we have assumed no …xed cost
of group membership, only a cost of founding a group.11 Second, note that in
this model the group founders do not have to be representative of the group in
the sense that they do not necessarily occupy a position at the centre of their
group. Indeed, it can be the case in a two group equilibrium, that the founders
of the groups are seen as extremists within their groups. Finally, we assume
individuals believe that they will have an e¤ect upon social outcomes. If they
were not to believe this, they would not engage in group activity, since they
incur a positive marginal cost in group action. Indeed, a feature of one-group
equilibrium in the case discussed above is that it would attract no group activity.
4.2 Model 2 - Instrumental Social Con‡ict
If the model of instrumental social compromise is built on Hamlin and Hjortlund’s
study of proportional representation, the model of instrumental social con‡ict
to be considered in this section relates most directly to Besley and Coate’s
analysis of the simple plurality voting rule, since both social con‡ict and the
plurality rule are de…ned in terms of a winner-take-all competition between
groups/candidates. Aside from the re-interpretation of the model, the key di¤er-
ences between the model to be developed and that of Besley and Coate concerns
the explicit modelling of a cost of con‡ict.
We assume that this cost is borne by all individuals who engage in group
activity and not just the founder. Furthermore, we shall make the (perhaps
9For ease we assume that indi¤erent individuals will participate in group activity, but we
could equally assume that they do not without changing the results of the model.
10Note that when c =0all individuals will wish to found groups - which will attract no
other members. This is the purely individualist limit of the group formation process where all
individuals enter directly into the production of the …nal social compromise with equal weight
(since each one-person group has an identical activity rate).
11This is worth noting in contrast with our next model of con‡ict where a membership
cost clearly exists in the sense that being a member of a group implies becoming involved in
con‡ict.
18rather strong) assumption that the cost falls on all group members in the same
way regardless of their own group activity level, and that the group with the
most members wins the ultimate contest. With this in mind, activity rates play
no driving role in the model of con‡ict.
We shall assume that the cost of con‡ict for a member i is given by ¯
³
no
ni
´
where ¯ is a weight and ni is the number of individuals active within the group
of which i is a member and no is the number of individuals in groups of which
i is not a member.
The payo¤ functions (1) and (2) are now rewritten as:
jP¡j ¡ xjj¡j Pj ¡ xjj¡
µ
c + ¯
µ
no
nj
¶¶
> 0 (25)
for all founders j
jP¡i ¡ xij¡j Pi ¡ xij¡
µ
c + ¯
µ
no
ni
¶¶
< 0 (26)
for all non-founders i:
We must also pay attention to the payo¤ functions of all non-founders in
stage two of the game. They now incur a con‡ict cost if they are group members.
Thus, they will only join groups if the instrumental bene…t of shifting the social
outcome outweighs this con‡ict cost. This is formalised as follows
jP¡d ¡ xdj¡j Pd ¡ xdj¡¯
µ
no
nd
¶
> 0 (27)
for all members d and
jP¡k ¡ xkj¡j Pk ¡ xkj¡¯
µ
no
nk
¶
< 0 (28)
for all independents k:
4.2.1 One-group equilibrium
Two conditions are required for a one-group equilibrium to exist:
i If no individual stands as a founder, the payo¤ to each individual is ¡z,
where z>c :As before, this simply assures us that at least one individual
will found a group.
ii No second individual wishes to enter as a founder. Consider the possibility
of an individual located at b entering against a such that the group founded
at b would win the eventual con‡ict with certainty. In this case:
jb ¡ aj <c (29)
is su¢cient to ensure that b does not enter. Note that if c>1,a n yp o s i t i o n
can constitute a one group equilibrium, and that as c approaches zero,
19the set of possible one-group equilibria shrinks until 0:5 is left as the only
potential one-group equilibrium. Note that in this case ¯
³
no
na
´
=0 ,w h i c h
simply means that there is no actual con‡ict in a one-group equilibrium.
In addition, since there is no individual, instrumental incentive to join
the single group, we will see no participation in group activity, so that all
except the founder will be independents. This is then a limiting - almost
degenerate - case in which the relatively high cost of acting as a founder
and the potential costs of con‡ict between groups yield an outcome in
which there are no e¤ective groups at all.
4.2.2 Two-group equilibrium
The conditions for a two-group equilibrium are as follows:
i a+b
2 =0 :5: For any positive cost of entry an individual will not wish to
enter if she expects to lose. Therefore, only individuals who expect to
obtain the same level of membership will compete against each other.
This requires that they occupy symmetric positions around the median.
ii For b and a to run against each other requires
1
2
jb ¡ aj¸c + ¯
µ
nb
na
¶
(30)
since
³
nb
na
´
=1 ,w eg e t ;
jb ¡ aj¸2(c + ¯) (31)
The result must be a tie for no individual would found a group knowing he
is going to lose. That is, his payo¤ in terms of e¤ecting the social outcome
would be zero, but he would still incur entry and con‡ict costs. Thus he
would be better o¤ not entering.
iii No other individual wishes to enter against a and b. Exactly which kind
of entrants will be deterred depends on whether we assume ‘honest’ at-
tachment (that is one joins the group founded closest to you) or ‘strategic
attachment’ (a possible Nash equilibrium strategy in the attachment stage
of the game, would be to join a group founder not located closest to you,
in order to prevent one’s least preferred founder from winning). Allowing
for strategic attachment expands the set of possible two-group equilibria,
to any set of symmetric individuals, whereas, assuming honest attachment
would prevent extremists from being a two-group equilibria.
For two group equilibria to exist, it must be the case that ¯ 6 0:5 and that
as jb ¡ aj become closer together, the value of ¯ must fall to allow for two-group
equilibria to continue to exist. This follows Besley and Coate in that we are
simply adding ¯ to c in the decision process for potential group founders.
20Where this model di¤ers is in the behaviour of non-founders. In Besley and
Coate all individuals who are not indi¤erent between candidates vote as it is
costless. This no longer holds here. Only individuals d for whom
jd ¡ aj¡0:5(jd ¡ bj + jd ¡ aj) ¸ ¯ (32)
or
jd ¡ aj¡j d ¡ bj¸2¯ (33)
when d is closer to b and
jd ¡ bj¡j d ¡ aj¸2¯ (34)
when d is closer to a will participate in group activity.
Note that for individual 0:5 the payo¤ for group activity is 0: Therefore if ¯>
0 individual 0:5 will not participate. This is unsurprising because he is indi¤erent
between the two groups and this is no di¤erent to the Besley and Coate scenario.
However, where the result does di¤er here is that individuals who do have a
preference over one group founder than another will not participate if 2¯>
jd ¡ aj¡j d ¡ bj. Therefore if ¯ is high few individuals will engage in social
con‡ict and extremists are the most likely combatants in two group equilibria.
In fact if ¯ =0 :5,a n dc =0 , 1 and 0 will sustain a two-group equilibrium, but
no other individual will wish to engage in group activity. As ¯ falls the range
of two group equilibria expands (assuming c is held constant at a low value)
as does the number of individuals prepared to engage in group activity. For
all individuals to engage in group activity requires that ¯ =0 , but this in fact
means there is no con‡ict. Thus it is not possible to have group con‡ict with
all individuals participating.
4.2.3 Discussion of Model 2
By shifting the emphasis to con‡ict rather than entry costs, we draw attention
to the cost-bene…t analysis facing potential members of groups (followers rather
than leaders) as well as the founders. As is the nature of plurality rule models
with complete information, individuals may be pivotal in determining the overall
outcome, and this provides the claimed instrumental incentive to participate.
The assumptions used here greatly simplify the analysis of con‡ict, for instance,
assuming that larger groups automatically win ignores a host of interesting
issues in the modelling of con‡ict (see Hirshleifer (1988) and (1995 )). Further,
we have not discussed how group activity actually translates into group con‡ict,
and whether individuals with di¤erent roles within a group may incur di¤erent
costs of con‡ict.12 For now though, this simpli…ed analysis serves our present
purposes. It demonstrates that, as con‡ict costs increase, group participation
diminishes until ¯>0:5 where no group activity will exist at all. Further, where
individuals do participate they have calculated that the instrumental bene…ts
12These issues will be a central concern of later work.
21are greater than the costs.13 Note again, as in the case of the compromise model,
that the group founders do not have to be representative of their groups. These
observations provide a useful benchmark for the expressive model that we shall
turn to now.
4.3 Model 3 - Expressive Motivation
A purely expressive model is sharply di¤erent from its instrumental counterpart
because we no longer need to discuss actual social outcomes in analysing ini-
tial decisions to join a group. Behaviour is assumed to be unrelated to overall
social outcomes as individuals believe that the e¤ect of their actions on over-
all outcomes are negligible. An individual’s motivation will be assumed to be
determined by two factors: utility gained from the size of the group; and the
individual’s location within the group relative to the founder. Clearly, actual
utility ex post will be e¤ected by …nal social outcomes, but these could be
viewed as externalities over which the individual has no e¤ective in‡uence ex
ante. Turning attention to preferences for group size captures the sense that
individuals are motivated to expressing themselves within a ‘group frame of
reference’.14
The “utility function”15 for an individual i who is a member of group j is
given by
Uij = f (nj;jxj ¡ xij) (35)
If an individual stands as founder his utility will be given by
Uii = f (ni;0) ¡ c (36)
and if the individual chooses to be independent of all group adherence (where
I stands for independent), his utility will be
UiI = f (1;0) (37)
where Unj may be positive, negative or zero depending on an individuals
ideal group size. Ujxj¡xij < 0 re‡ects the idea that individuals become worse o¤
as the distance between themselves and the group founder increases. If we were
to ignore the issue of distance from the founder, then this model would in e¤ect
become a simple club good model. The idea here is similar; one may wish to
13In this sense, when costs of con‡ict are high, we should expect to see very little group
activism. However, just as we do see group participation even where only one group exists,
we often see high levels of group activity where the con‡ict costs are substantial. Again, this
points to a model less tied to eventual social outcomes.
14In addition to the work by Hardin and Kuran discussed earlier, this section relates to a
paper by Van Winden (1999) calling for a group frame of reference in political economics. It
also relates to a recent paper by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) which provides a model for how
group identity e¤ects decision-making. Finally, the purely expressive model presented here
has strong similarites with the sorting/segregation models in Schelling (1978).
15Note again that we use the term utility function loosely here as ex post utility will be
e¤ected by social outcomes.
22be in groups simply for reasons of camaraderie and communication. When the
group becomes large, bene…ts such as these may be diminished as congestion
sets in. We assume (for ease) that all individuals have the same preferences over
the size of the group, and di¤er only in their locations.
In the analysis to follow, to clarify matters, we will assume an additively
separable functional form as follows. In the case where individuals join a group
with founder j their utility is:
Uij = ®(g(nj)) + ° (l(jxj ¡ xij)) (38)
As indicated we assume that the e¤ect of changes in nj upon utility may be
either positive or negative, depending upon the size of group individuals prefer
to be in. However, greater distance from the group founder unambiguously
makes the individual worse o¤. ® and ° are weights upon these factors. We will
use this form of the utility function to derive conditions concerning equilibria.
If an individual stands a group founder, his utility will be:
Uii = ®(g(ni)) + ° (l(0)) ¡ c (39)
and if he chooses to be independent his utility will be:
UiI = ®(g(1)) + ° (l(0)) (40)
We will assume that n must be greater than one to be de…ned as a group.
T h es t r u c t u r eo ft h eg a m et ob ep l a y e dh e r ei st h a ti ns t a g eo n eg r o u p
founders enter, in stage two individuals who did not found groups decide whether
to attach themselves to groups or decide whether to be independent. In stage
three, the outcomes in terms of group size and location within groups are given.
This set-up for the expressive game would require much more speci…cation to
allow for the kind of numerical solutions which we derived in the instrumental
models. However, this simple approach allows to set out clear conditions for
equilibria. We provide these conditions for one and two-group equilibria and
then provide a fairly informal discussion as to how these equilibria might come
to exist.
4.3.1 One-Group Equilibrium
i We assume that if no groups form the value of being independent is inferior
to being a group founder (even if no other individuals join ones group),
this is given by
Ujj ¡ c ¸ UjI(0) (41)
where UjI(0) refers to the utility that individual j would receive from
being independent when no groups have formed. This ensures that one
individual will enter as a group founder.
23ii To ensure that no other individual wishes to enter against individual j,
we require that for all other individuals either: they prefer to join group
j or they prefer to be independent, rather than enter as founder. In the
…rst case this means that for all individuals i;
Uii ¡ c<U ij (42)
which becomes;
®(g(ni) ¡ g(nj)) + ° (l(0) ¡ ljxj ¡ xij) <c (43)
The case of independence means that
Uii ¡ c<U iI (44)
which becomes
®(g(ni) ¡ g(1)) <c (45)
How might one-group equilibria emerge? Note that three factors determine
the equilibria in this model, the preference for the size of the group one would
like to be in, preferences for location within a group and the cost of entry. To
keep matters tractable, we shall start by ignoring the e¤ects of entry costs (by
assuming they are constant at some arbitrary low level) and we shall assume that
° =0 , thus preferences are only for group size. Let us also assume, for simplicity,
that individuals wish to be in a group with the whole population. It should be
clear here, that a one-group equilibrium will emerge and further, the founder
may be located at any point on the distribution.16 Indeed, even if we assume
that preferences identify ideal groups smaller than the whole population, but
still very large, it is still highly likely that there will be a one-group equilibrium.
Now let us assume that °>0, so that individuals care about their location
within groups. How might this e¤ect one-group equilibria? Once again ignoring
the e¤ects of entry costs and still assuming that the preference is for very large
groups we should expect the set of potential one-group equilibria to be reduced,
so that only more central individuals could emerge as founders in one-group
equilibrium. In this case, extremists will not be able to found groups unopposed,
as individuals at the opposite extreme will also wish to found groups.
Finally, let us consider the e¤ect of di¤ering cost levels. The e¤ect of high
costs are twofold, …rst, they make the emergence of one-group equilibria more
likely, for instance even if preferences are for small groups joined with a deep
concern for one’s location, if costs are set at an extremely high level, only one
individual will found a group in equilibrium. Second, a related point, is that
an e¤ect of high entry costs is to allow for a wider set of potential points for
one-group equilibria. Obviously, if the costs of entry are low and the preference
is for small groups then one-group equilibria are not likely to be possible.
16Individuals are assumed to want to be in a group with everybody else, but since we
assumed ° =0 , they will not care who the founder of that group will be.
24In summary, then, one-group equilibrium will be associated with (a) prefer-
ences which identify large ideal group size, (b) preferences that attach relatively
little weight to location within group and (c) relatively high costs of entry as a
group founder.
4.3.2 Two-Group Equilibrium
This requires that two individuals are prepared to enter as founders against each
other and that no other individual wishes to form a group.
A two group equilibria founded by i and j requires that for i
i
Uii ¡ c ¸ Uij (46)
ii
Uii ¡ c ¸ UiI (47)
These conditions are clearly replicated for j:
If we take individual i and plug in the functional form, conditions 46 and 47
become;
®(g (ni) ¡ g (nj)) + ° (lj0j¡ljxj ¡ xij) ¸ c (48)
®(g(ni) ¡ g(1)) ¸ c (49)
For all other individuals k it is required that either
iii
Ukk ¡ c<U ki (50)
or
Ukk ¡ c<U kj (51)
or
Ukk ¡ c<U kI (52)
Constructing n-group equilibria would require going through this process for
situations where there are more than two groups.
How might two-group equilibria emerge. Similar observations to those made
for one-group equilibria may be made. First, if the preference is for very large
groups, there must be a concern with location to enough of an extent to allow for
two individuals to enter at stage one. Second, if the preference is for moderately
sized groups, then the concern with location can be reduced to some extent and
25two groups may still emerge. However, some concern over location would be
required for segregating equilibria to emerge.17 Third, costs of entry cannot be
so high as to prevent a second group emerging. Finally, if costs are low and
the preference is to be in small groups, two-group equilibria are unlikely to be
possible.
4.3.3 Discussion of Model 3
In this section we have set out the conditions for group formation in one or two-
group equilibria in a model containing a sharply di¤erent source of motivation to
that of the previous instrumental models. Individuals now form and join groups
on the basis of a preference for interaction within groups divorced from the
eventual social outcomes which the interaction between groups brings about. We
mentioned earlier that while social outcomes play no role ex ante in individual
decision-making, they do carry consequences ex post. In this case individuals
may be engaging in group activity under expressive motivation which they would
not have engaged in at all under purely instrumental motivation.
4.4 Model 4 - Instrumental/Expressive Motivation
We now wish to construct a model which incorporates both instrumental and
expressive motivation. The instrumental motivation contained in the models for
social compromise and con‡ict constructed earlier is generated by a shift in the
social outcome towards one’s preferred outcome. The expressive motivation lies
in one’s preferences over the size of the group one belongs to, and one’s location
within that group.
We can formalise this as follows, the utility function for an individual i who
is a member of group j is given by
Uij = f (nj;jxj ¡ xij;jPij ¡ xij) ¡ ¯
µ
no
nj
¶
(53)
where nj is the size of group j, jxj ¡ xij is i0s location within group j and
jPij ¡ xij is the di¤erence between the social outcome and the individual’s pre-
ferred social outcome, given that he has chosen to be a member of group j.
Obviously utility is declining in jPij ¡ xij and this re‡ects the instrumental ele-
ment to group involvement. ¯
³
no
nj
´
re‡ects potential con‡ict costs and clearly
this term is not relevant in models of compromise.
If i stands as a founder, his utility function is given by
Uii = f (ni;0;jPii ¡ xij) ¡ c ¡ ¯
µ
no
ni
¶
(54)
17A segregating equilibrium can be de…ned as containing groups whereby if xi and xi+r are
the boundary members of a group, all individual x such that xi <x<x i+r are also members
of the group.
26Finally if i opts to be independent, his utility function is given by
UiI = f (1;0;jPiI ¡ xij) (55)
If we continue to work with the more speci…c utility function used earlier, the
conditions 53, 54 and 55 become
Uij = ®(g (nj)) + ° (ljxj ¡ xij)+±(ÀjPij ¡ xij) ¡ ¯
µ
no
nj
¶
(56)
where ± is a weight upon the instrumental factor.
Uii = ®(g(ni)) + ° (l(0)) + ±(ÀjPii ¡ xij) ¡ c ¡ ¯
µ
no
ni
¶
(57)
UiI = ®(g (1)) + ° (l(0)) + ±(ÀjPiI ¡ xij) (58)
4.4.1 Discussion of mixed model
As before, the mixed motivation approach relates to two possible settings: social
compromise and social con‡ict. We could go through the rather tedious task
of setting out the algebra for one and two-group equilibria to exist in each of
these environments, but instead we shall provide an informal discussion of how
expressive concerns may impact on the instrumental equilibria already identi…ed,
and in so doing, pick out what we consider to be the most striking features of
combining the two motivations.
Consider …rst, the setting of social compromise (model 1). A number of
features were associated with the equilibria derived there. In the case of one-
group equilibria, we found that costs of entry had to be above a certain level
for equilibria to exist, and that the higher the costs, the larger the set of po-
tential equilibria. In addition, there would be no incentive for group participa-
tion (recall that since no instrumental incentive to action would be on o¤er for
group action, a positive marginal cost would rule out the possibility of group
action). The addition of expressive motivation modi…es this conclusion in two
main ways, …rst the factor of cost is less relevant if individuals wish to be in
very large groups (and do not have too deep a concern about their within group
location). In addition, participation will generally arise, individuals may now
obtain direct expressive group bene…ts, rather than indirect instrumental bene-
…ts. This is similar to the idea that an expressive model of voting will account
for participation even when the candidates on o¤er are identical.
In two-group equilibria, under purely instrumental motivations costs were
required to be below a certain level, there was no requirement that founders
should be symmetric around the median position and participation was now
possible (assuming that positive marginal instrumental returns to group action
outweighed positive marginal costs). The addition of the expressive line of
27reasoning to some extent augments these conclusions, such that it produces
additional bene…ts to participation and concerns regarding one’s location within
a group are similar to concerns regarding one’s location with respect to the
social outcome. However, a di¤erence is that expressive concerns may lead some
individuals to choose to join a group where the founder is located further from
them. This is possible if a preference to be in a large group plays a major role in
the individual’s utility function, and this may be so even when preferences for
group size are the same across all individuals. In the instrumental two-group
equilibrium, individuals always join the group located closest to them.
Let us now consider the other possible setting of social con‡ict with both
instrumental and expressive concerns. Similar to the compromise setting, one-
group equilibria in the con‡ict setting may arise due to high costs of entry
and expected con‡ict. If these costs were lowered, the set of potential one-
group equilibria shrinks until 0:5 would be the only remaining point as costs
approach zero. For the same reasons as for compromise, there would be no
group participation. Adding expressive concerns here has the same e¤ect as
it did for one-group equilibrium in the compromise setting. Signi…cantly, it
provides a rationale for group participation, and a desire to be in large groups
would add to the instrumental reasons for a one-group equilibrium emerging.
Under social con‡ict, costs were required to be below a certain level for two-
group equilibrium to emerge. The group founders had to be symmetric around
the median, and the level of participation depended upon the con‡ict cost.18
The introduction of an expressive component signi…cantly alters this picture.
A radical example of how equilibria may be altered, is that a (certainly) losing
group may form in equilibrium, whereas under purely instrumental motivation,
all groups must have a positive probability of winning. For a losing group to
emerge in equilibrium, the expressive return would be required to outweigh the
expected con‡ict cost. This is simply to say that the desire to be in a group of
like-minded individuals may be strong enough to outweigh the associated costs
of con‡ict even when it is acknowledged that there is no prospect of winning in
the competition for social outcomes.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has attempted to re-interpret and extend the model of political
competition to provide for a focus on political groups rather than individuals,
and to forms of competition between groups more general than elections. To this
end we have adopted and adapted the citizen candidate approach to provide the
formal basis for endogenising group emergence, and studied both instrumental
and expressive motivations and two forms of competition between groups.
We believe that the inclusion of expressive motivation allows us to under-
stand examples of group behaviour that would be di¢cult to rationalise using
only instrumental motivation. For instance, one signi…cant advantage of the
18We do, however, accept that the model of con‡ict used in this paper is highly stylised.
28mixed-motive model outlined here is that it o¤ers an explanation of the exis-
tence of political groups that seem to have little or no realistic chance of a¤ecting
social outcomes. Examples might include small minority parties in situations
where the electoral system o¤ers such parties no real prospect of power or in-
‡uence; or small revolutionary groups that have little or no prospect of success.
The explanation lies not in attributing such groups false beliefs about their own
instrumental signi…cance, but in understanding the expressive value of group
membership as a potentially powerful in‡uence on behaviour.
The models derived here could be viewed as a starting point for a sequence
of studies. We have provided an account of the formation of competing political
groups. Given that we model group members as possessing both instrumental
and expressive concerns, a next step will be to ask how political organisations
emerge out of these basic groups, and how groups provide incentives for group
members to supply leadership or organisational services that may improve the
prospects of the group. We would also be interested in how political repre-
sentatives with the support of their group may choose violence rather than
‘normal politics’ as a means to achieve group goals - which might be thought
of in terms of a choice between forms of competition. In addition, normative
issues are raised by the models outlined here, since the outcomes that emerge
may be ine¢cient in the standard sense. This then leads to a consideration
of whether groups (or founders) can reach constitutional agreements that may
serve to improve the outcomes that emerge. The role of expressive rather than
instrumental motivations in providing a di¤erent perspective on constitutional
issues is one that has yet to be fully explored.
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